Related Publications – Ullin Thomas Place (1924

17 publications that cite Place (1954). The concept of heed.

Alston, W. P. (1971). Dispositions and occurrences. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1(2), 125–154. www.jstor.org/stable/40230343
[Citing Place (1954)]

Chappell, V. C. (Ed.). (1962). The Philosophy of Mind. Prentice-Hall.
[Citing Place (1954)] [Reprints in this collection] [1 referring publications by Place]

Fisher, A. R. J. (2022). The two Davids and Australian Materialism. In P. R. Anstey, & D. Braddon-Mitschell (Eds.), Armstrong's Materialist Theory of Mind (pp. 29-51). Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780192843722.003.0004
[Citing Place (1954) in context] [Citing Place (1956) in context]

Gusman, S. (2016). The Phenomenological Fallacy and the Illusion of Immanence: Analytic Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology Against Mental Reification. Diametros, (48), 18-37.
[Abstract]Throughout the history of analytic philosophy the notion of the ‘phenomenological fallacy’ originally formulated by Place, has been used to criticize reification of the mental. Although this fallacy was originally not used to criticize the phenomenological tradition, it has popped up recently in debates between analytic philosophers and phenomenologists. However, a study of the history of both traditions reveals that a polemical notion similar, if not identical, to the phenomenological fallacy can be found within the phenomenological tradition, namely Sartre’s ‘illusion of immanence’. In this article, I will explicate these two polemical notions and place them in the context of their respective traditions. This will reveal that both notions must be understood as criticism of a certain form of representationalism I will call ‘dual-world representationalism’. This deep-rooted similarity between analytic philosophy of mind and phenomenology, in turn, sheds a new light on current discussions between the two traditions. On a final note, I compare the criticism to the views of Metzinger, a contemporary analytic philosopher who uses the phenomenological fallacy to accuse his adversaries.
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy
[Citing Place (1954)] [Citing Place (1956)]

Mitchell, P., & Riggs, K. (2000). A proposal for the development of a mental vocabulary, with special reference to pretence and false belief. In P. Mitchell, & K. Riggs (Eds.), Children's reasoning and the mind (pp. 51-80). Psychology Press.
[Citing Place (1954)]

Nannini, S. (2023) The mind-body problem in philosophy and the cognitive sciences. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, 14(1-2), 118-134. doi:10.4453/rifp.2023.0009
[Abstract]Here, I examine the main philosophical solutions to the mind-body problem distinguishing between “historicist” solutions that (more or less clearly) separate philosophy from science and solutions that instead result from a double “cognitive turn”, and see “continuity” between philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences. The “historicist” solutions include ontological dualism (together with “skepticism” and “new mysterianism”), epistemological dualism, subjective idealism, and absolute idealism. In this group, transcendental idealism, phenomenology, and neutral monism are the solutions most open to a dialogue between philosophy and science. The “naturalistic” solutions can be divided into four groups: (1) behaviorism (psychological, logical, philosophical-analytical behaviorism); (2) materialism (identity theory, physicalism); (3) “weak naturalism” (functionalism, anomalous monism, “biological naturalism”, liberal naturalism, emergentism); (4) “strong naturalism” (“cognitive neo-evolutionism”, eliminativism). These offer a physicalist-eliminative solution to the mind-body problem (here called “soft physicalistic eliminativism”) that allows for more continuity between philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences.
[Citing Place (1954) in context] [Citing Place (1956) in context] [Citing Place (1988a) in context] [Citing Place (1998a) in context]

Penelhum, T. (1957). The logic of pleasure. Philosophy and Phenomenological Reearch, 17, 488-503.
[Citing Place (1954)] [2 referring publications by Place] [1 reprinting collections]

Place, T. W. (2022). Understanding the types of language in behavioural science: Reply to Phil Reed on the work of Ullin T. Place. Behavior and Philosophy, 50, 52-64. behavior.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/BP-v50-Place.pdf
[Abstract]Reed (2022) states that according to Ullin Place’s latest view, intensional statements are not necessarily connected with mentalist language and explanations, and intensionality is the mark of the conversational. This is false. Place’s view is that intensionality is the mark of a quotation. Quotations are sentences that express the content of propositional attitudes. They are characterised by what Frege called ‘indirect reference’ and Quine ‘referential opacity’. Intensionality is nothing more than this. Intensional statements stating propositional attitudes are at the heart of the mentalist language. Propositional attitudes are dispositions. Dispositions are the nature of things and are at the core of all sciences. The doings of a person are the active manifestations of dispositions. Place defines mentalism at the level of the person, which is also the level of behaviourism. This contrasts with a standard definition of mentalism at the subpersonal level, also known as centrism. Doing or behaving is interacting with the environment. This is common to the scientific approaches at the level of the person. Articulating the same conceptual foundation and language and each approach having its dialect must be possible. This is “relevan[t] for understanding the types of language that could be used in explanations given by behavioural science” (Reed, 2022).
[Citing Place (1954)] [Citing Place (1956)] [Citing Place (1978a)] [Citing Place (1981a)] [Citing Place (1983d)] [Citing Place (1984a)] [Citing Place (1984c)] [Citing Place (1985c)] [Citing Place (1987a)] [Citing Place (1991f)] [Citing Place (1996g)] [Citing Place (1996j)] [Citing Place (1996l)] [Citing Place (1998c)] [Citing Place (1998d)] [Citing Place (1999)] [Citing Place (1999a)] [Citing Place (1999f)] [Citing Place (1999g)] [Citing Place (2000a)] [Citing Place (2000d)] [Is reply to]
Download: Place (2022) Understanding the Types of Language in Behavioural Science - Reply to Phil Reed on the Work of Ullin T Place.pdf

Reed, P. (2022). The concept of intensionality in the work of Ullin T. Place. Behavior and Philosophy, 50, 20-38. behavior.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/BPv50-Reed.pdf
[Abstract]The current paper overviews of the notion of intensionality as it is presented in the work of Ullin Place, with the aim of characterising Place’s somewhat neglected thinking about this topic. Ullin Place’s work showed a development regarding his views concerning this topic, which, in themselves, illustrate a variety of possible stances that can be taken towards the concept of intensionality. Ultimately, Place suggested that ‘intensional’ statements are not necessarily connected with ‘mentalistic’ language, nor with ‘mentalistic’ explanations. Rather, Place came to the view that intensionality should be taken to be the mark of the ‘conversational’ – that is, it is a property of verbal behaviour that characterises nonscientific everyday discourse. This view has relevance to furthering the understanding of Place’s work regarding intensionality, and also relevance for understanding the types of language that could be used in explanations given by behavioural science.
Note:
Place (2022) argues that this article is a rather misleading exposition of Ullin T. Place's work on intensionality and the types of language in behavioural science.
[Citing Place (1954)] [Citing Place (1956)] [Citing Place (1978a)] [Citing Place (1981a)] [Citing Place (1984c)] [Citing Place (1987a)] [Citing Place (1996g)] [Citing Place (1999e)] [Citing Place (1999f)] [Is replied by]
Download: Reed (2022) The Concept of Intensionality in the Work of Ullin T Place.pdf

Suojanen, M. (2019). Conscious experience and quantum consciousness theory: Theories, causation, and identity. E-LOGOS – Electronic Journal for Philosophy, 26(2), 14–34. doi:10.18267/j.e-logos.465
[Abstract]Generally speaking, the existence of experience is accepted, but more challenging has been to say what experience is and how it occurs. Moreover, philosophers and scholars have been talking about mind and mental activity in connection with experience as opposed to physical processes. Yet, the fact is that quantum physics has replaced classical Newtonian physics in natural sciences, but the scholars in humanities and social sciences still operate under the obsolete Newtonian model. There is already a little research in which mind and conscious experience are explained in terms of quantum theory. This article argues that experience is impossible to be both a physical and non-physical phenomenon. When discussing causality and identity as transcendental, quantum theory may imply the quantum physical nature of conscious experience, where a person associates causality to conscious experience, and, thus, the result is that the double-aspect theory and the mind/brain identity theory would be refuted.
[Citing Place (1954)] [Citing Place (1956)]

Tamminga, A. (2009). In de ban van de metafysica. De identiteitstheorieën van Place, Smart en Armstrong [Under the spell of metaphysics. Place's, Smart's and Armstrong's identity theories.]. Tijdschrift voor filosofie, 71, 553-575.
[Abstract]We investigate the genesis of metaphysical physicalism and its influence on the development of Place's, Smart's, and Armstrong's ideas on the relation between the mental and the physical. We first reconstruct the considerations that led Armstrong and Smart to a 'scientific' world view. We call 'metaphysical physicalism' the comprehensive theory on reality, truth, and meaning which ensued from this world view. Against the background of this metaphysical physicalism we study Armstrong's and Smart's analyses of secondary properties and the genesis of their identity theories of mind and matter. We argue that fundamental revisions in Smart's theories on colour and consciousness were driven by his aspiration to fully work out the philosophical consequences of metaphysical physicalism. Finally, we briefly consider the role metaphysical physicalism has played in twentieth-century philosophy of mind.
[Citing Place (1954)] [Citing Place (1956)] [Citing Place (1960)]
Download: Tamminga (2009) In de Ban van de Metafysica.pdf

Tartaglia, J. (2013). Conceptualizing physical consciousness. Philosophical Psychology, 26(6), 817-838. doi:10.1080/09515089.2013.770940
[Abstract]Theories that combine physicalism with phenomenal concepts abandon the phenomenal irrealism characteristic of 1950s physicalism, thereby leaving physicalists trying to reconcile themselves to concepts appropriate only to dualism. Physicalists should instead abandon phenomenal concepts and try to develop our concepts of conscious states. Employing an account of concepts as structured mental representations, and motivating a model of conceptual development with semantic externalist considerations, I suggest that phenomenal concepts misrepresent their referents, such that if our conception of consciousness incorporates them, it needs development. I then argue that the "phenomenal concept strategy" (PCS) of a purely cognitive account of the distinction between phenomenal and physical concepts combines physicalism with phenomenal concepts only by misrepresenting physical properties. This is because phenomenal concepts carry ontological commitment, and I present an argument to show the tension between this commitment and granting ontological authority to physical concepts only. In the final section, I show why phenomenal concepts are more ontologically committed than PCS theorists can allow, revive U.T. Place's notion of a “phenomenological fallacy” to explain their enduring appeal, and then suggest some advantages of functional analyses of concepts of conscious states over the phenomenal alternative.
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy
[Citing Place (1954)] [Citing Place (1956)] [Citing Place (2002a)] [Related]
Download: Tartaglia (2013) Conceptualizing Physical Consciousness.pdf

Valentine, E. R. (1996). Folk psychology and its implications for cognitive science: Discussion. In W. O'Donohue, & R. Kitchener (Eds.) The Philosophy of Psychology (Chapter 17, pp. 275-278). Sage. doi:10.4135/9781446279168.n17
[Citing Place (1954) in context] [Citing Place (1996l) in context]

White, A. R. (1960). Different Kinds of Heed Concepts. Analysis, 20(5), 112–116. doi:10.2307/3327080
[Citing Place (1954)]

White, A. R. (1963). Attending and noticing. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, LXIII, 103-126.
[Citing Place (1954)]

White, A. R. (1964). Attention. Blackwell
[Citing Place (1954)]